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ABSTRACT
In the late 19th century Husserl studied our internal sense of time passing, maintaining that its
deep  connections  into  experience  represent  prima  facie  evidence  for  it  as  the  basis  for  all
investigations in the sciences: Phenomenology was born. Merleau-Ponty focused on perception
pointing out that any theory of experience must in accord with established aspects of biology i.e.
embodied. Recent analyses suggest that theories of experience require non-reductive, integrative
information, together with a specific property connecting them to experience. Here we elucidate
a new class of information states with just such properties found at the loci of control of complex
biological systems, including nervous systems. 
Complexity biology concerns states satisfying self-organized criticality. Such states are located
at  critical  instabilities,  commonly  observed  in  biological  systems,  and  thought  to  maximize
information diversity and processing, and hence to optimize regulation. Major results for biology
follow: why organisms have unusually low entropies; and why they are not merely mechanical.
Criticality states form singular self-observing systems, which reduce wave packets by processes
of  perfect  self-observation  associated  with  feedback gain  g=1.  Analysis  of  their  information
properties leads to identification of a new kind of information state with high levels of internal
coherence, and feedback loops integrated into their structure.  
The major idea presented here is that the integrated feedback loops are responsible for our ‘sense
of self’,  and also the feeling of continuity in our sense of time passing. Long-range internal
correlations guarantee a unique kind of non-reductive, integrative information structure enabling
such states to naturally support phenomenal experience. Being founded in complexity biology,
they are ‘embodied’; they also fulfill the statement that ‘The self is a process’, a singular process.
High  internal  correlations  and  René  Thom-style  catastrophes  support  non-digital  forms  of
information, gestalt cognition, and information transfer via quantum teleportation. Criticality in
complexity  biology can ‘embody’ cognitive  states  supporting gestalts,  and phenomenology’s
senses of ‘self,’ time passing, existence and being.
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INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of experience with its inner sense of ‘self’, together with the sense of passing
of time, and the sense of existence or being, has been the subject of analysis and speculation
since philosophy began. Each of us answers, ‘Present!’ to a roll-call; we all have a ‘sense of our
own  presence’  though  we  may  not  know  how  it  arises.  The  emergence  of  energy  as  a
fundamental concept in the 19th century and the founding of experimental psychology led to the
dismissal of traditional concepts by science at the time. It was said that first psychology lost its
soul, then it lost its mind. Whether or not it was in reaction to this, history may not relate, but
around that  time,  the young Edmund Husserl,  despite  showing promise  as  a  mathematician,
decided to switch his field of research to philosophy and started studying with Brentano, whose
work1 deeply impressed him. 
Husserl’s mature work focused on the subjective experience of time. Its experience as an internal
reality, contrasting with the experience of space as an external reality, has been noted in both
East and West for millennia. Husserl made critical use of it in developing Phenomenology, his
philosophy  of  experience,  particularly  using  it  in  the  title  of  his  fundamental  work,  The
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness2, which laid the foundation for the development
of Phenomenology as a field of study and its spreading throughout the world. 
Husserl’s  student,  Martin  Heidegger,  further  developed  his  teacher’s  approach,  in  his
fundamental ‘Sein und Seit’3 – ‘Being and Time’,  but differed from him in his analysis and
detailed  opinion  of  the  structure  of  the  time  concept,  developing  his  own  interpretation  as
‘Dasein’.  To  most  scientists,  these  ideas  remain  obscure,  almost  an  anathema.  This  article
presents a new biologically based class of information state, which can form a biophysical basis
for a scientific model of subjective experience, with abilities to support (a) a sense of self, (b) a
sense of continuing existence, and therefore (c) senses of both ‘being’ and ‘time’: a biophysical
model for phenomenology. 
These information states occur in complex biological systems at their loci of control. They are
therefore  serendipitously  well  placed  to  give  whole  organisms  the  sense  of  identity  and
continuing existence, which we humans agree to be the basis for effective interaction with the
world of sense perception. They therefore satisfy the basic requirement noted by another famous
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philosopher  of  Phenomenology,  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty,  who  emphasized  the  need  for
phenomenal  experience to be embodied4,  i.e.  coupled to known biological  structures. This in
itself raises interesting points, because in the absence of the theory presented in this article, the
neural and cognitive sciences usually assume that the only form of information available to the
brain is digital,  the kind of information exhibited by visual images mapped onto cells in the
optical cortex, and similar digital models of information on the surface of the brain, originating
in the work of Warren McCullough. 5
This is probably not true. The brain represents information that way in the cortex  before it is
cognized in experience. The structure of cortical networks of neurons enables them to support
the  intricate  phenomena  associated  with  complexity  biology.  Only  when  transformed  by  a
specialized neural process, mathematically equivalent to a ‘linear transform’, does information
enter conscious experience, and then only in processed form.
As recounted in the next section,  loci of control of complex biological  systems are states of
critical instability, or ‘criticality’, with properties completely different from ordinary states of
matter. This forms the seed for the thesis presented in this article:  complex biological systems
contain control structures with information states supporting an internal sense of self i.e. of
subjectivity, and a continuous sense of existence, or ‘being in time’. 
Merleau-Ponty’s principle  of embodiment  presents an important  condition that  any theory of
experience must satisfy: it  must be consistent with the empirical basis of biology; the theory
presented  here  satisfies  it  fully.  Previous  restriction  of  information  theories  to  digital
information, which obviously cannot support a subjective sense, has come to be interpreted as
meaning that ‘embodiment’ restricts biological systems to digital information representations of
experience, and that any sense of ‘self’, or subjectivity, is baseless. Although it has thus come to
be interpreted to mean that only the physical body exists, and that all sense of subjectivity is
illusory,  the  approach adopted  in  this  article  shows that  this  is  not  the  case.  In  complexity
biology, organisms can ‘embody’ Husserl and Heidegger’s three phenomenological properties of
Self, Being and Time. 
Preliminary  aspects  of  this  work  have  been  presented  to  the  continuing  series  of  biennial
conferences, ‘Towards a Science of Consciousness’, held at the University of Arizona, Tucson.
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The approach has therefore been more oriented to the kind of questions raised by the organizers
of those conferences, such as Bernard Baars, David Chalmers, and Dr Stuart Hameroff. Tucson
phenomenology goes beyond philosophy,  and attempts  to  develop scientific  theories  of  how
conscious experience is embedded in the brain and nervous system. In this endeavor, it looks to
the fundamental work of David Chalmers6, who together with his colleague, Jonathan Shear7, has
distinguished between the  ‘hard’  and ‘easy’  problems of  consciousness.  The easy problems,
Chalmers  stated,  consist  of  questions  that  can  be  solved  by  understanding  conventional
information  processing in  the nervous system, such as  how memory or emotional  states  are
brought to awareness, difficult  though that may be. The ‘hard’ problem consists of questions
clearly  not  susceptible  to  explanations  in  terms  of  conventional  digital-type  information
processing.6 They  may  include  the  three  phenomenological  properties,  and  how  qualitative
properties of experience, qualia, such as harmonies, colours, tastes and smells, or even pleasure
and pain, take the form they do. As Chalmers states6, experience is the hard problem. 
Chalmers’ achievement included identification of conditions that physical theories of experience
must  satisfy.  These  include  conditions  on  the  theoretical  physics  to  be  used,  and  are  thus
connected to my own training as a theoretical physicist. This article’s concern is with the physics
of information states supporting phenomenal experience. Details of the physics are necessary to
show how the proposed information states satisfy properties proposed by Husserl, Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty, and their illustrious predecessors like Descartes, and Immanuel Kant. What of
the wealth of earlier, eastern philosophers who perceptively discussed the whole question, often
bringing out important highly valuable points of their own, presaging more modern, 20 th century
versions? A further special issue promises to remedy any such deficiency. 
As is obvious to one and all,  digital information processing structures do not communicate a
sense of their own experience, in the same way that humans can, or animals with whom humans
have learned to communicate, including chimps, gorillas, dogs, cats and parrots etc. Anyone who
has read, ‘The Elephant Whisperer’8 and its aftermath, or Elsa the Lioness9 will realize that self-
awareness is far from being limited to the human condition, though verbal language and its use
in higher intellectual dialogues, problem solving and political ideologies may be. Humans know
what it is ‘like’ to be human, as Nagel10 has pointed out. Animals, one suspects, also know what
it  is  like  to  be  their  particular  species.  But,  as  Penrose11 argued,  even  the  world’s  greatest
4
supercomputer cannot be expected to answer the question, ‘What is it like to be a computer?’
The deficiency, we propose, lies in the kind of information that it is designed to process.
The extent to which this article makes inroads on the ‘hard’ problem will be discussed at the end,
but the results obtained are certainly without precedent and speak for themselves, requiring little
justification for the approach adopted. Many contributions to this volume position themselves
carefully. The Gare-Kauffman prologue12 discussing endophysics and endobiology, for example,
represents a collaboration between a philosopher and a scientist, both of whom are leaders in
their respective fields. It contains enlightening perspectives on how an expert in phenomenology
and a leader in complexity biology can collaborate to illuminate the whole field. The article on
‘Situated  Phenomenology’13 is  precise  in  justifying  its  perspective.  This  article’s  position  is
based on the author’s academic training and subsequent fields of research, including refereed
articles  in  such  areas  as  critical  phenomena14,  quantum  field  theory15,  elementary  particle
physics16,  and  cosmological  nucleosynthesis.  17 It  combines  the  very  different  disciplines  of
quantum  theory,  control  theory,  and  critical  phenomena  to  perform  an  unusual  analysis  of
critically  unstable  states at  the heart  of regulation in complexity biology – in  particular,  the
properties of their excited states regarded as a new class of information state. 
In contrast to the justification expected of a philosopher in adopting the ‘position’ presented in
his perspective on a particular question, a scientific discovery requires no such justification. If
worthwhile, the discovery speaks for itself. The problems it solves, major or minor, in its field of
concern, justify its perspective. The ‘position’ of a new approach to interpreting semiotics as a
contribution to phenomenology18, for example, might require justification, but not a scientific
model that can incorporate semiosis, as the one here presented. 
On the other hand, a particular school of thought, such as that promoted by Chalmers and his
colleagues like Hameroff and Penrose may need positioning. To this author’s mind, the Tucson
approach is useful, because it defines the physical and information properties to be satisfied by a
non-trivial  biophysical  description  of  experience.  Many people  have  contributed  from many
perspectives,  and  leading  mathematical  physicists  have  been,  or  continue  to  be  involved,
including  Brian  Josephson,  Roger  Penrose,  ECG  (George)  Sudarshan,  and  Henry  Stapp.
Josephson19 has suggested that the physics of biology may prove to be more fundamental than
the quantum field theories of elementary particle physics. Penrose has made many suggestions.
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First, information structures supporting experience should exhibit high coherence20; second the
mind’s  intellectual  apprehension of  mathematics  is  capable  of  making  intuitive  leaps  to  the
answer transcending any logical  reasoning based on ordinary,  digital  information processing:
information processing in the mind almost  certainly has no digital  analog11;  third it  must be
capable of producing orchestrated reduction21 of wave packets. This article makes contributions
to all these questions. 
With  scientists  of  such  quality  taking  active  interest  in  the  Tucson  approach,  little  further
justification  seems  necessary.  A  recent  review  of  that  approach  by  M.I.T.  physicist,  Max
Tegmark22 mentions connections between emergence of consciousness and emergence of time,
clearly relevant to phenomenology.  He suggests that, ‘consciousness can be understood as a
state  of  matter…  with  distinctive  information  processing  abilities’,  which  he  calls
‘perceptronium’. Here, we follow the spirit of his approach to review the factors now considered
essential in any theory of experience, particularly because the theory developed here turns out to
satisfy them all, as later sections recount in detail.
One  important  background  perspective  is  that  every  culture  contains  accounts  of  states  of
awareness where the information content of experience has been eliminated, and the knower is
left  in  a  state  where  pure  self-consciousness  alone  remains.  Such states  of  ‘pure  subjective
experience’, or ‘pure consciousness’, have been discussed in detail by Shear23, who has made
their study a large portion of his life’s work. Since techniques to train any person, scientist or
otherwise,  to  arrive  at  clear  experiences  of  such states,  are  widely  available24,  there  are  no
grounds for denying their existence. Also, Varela and Shear25 have justified the acceptance of
subjective, first person accounts of experience, so it is reasonable to include them in an article
such as this one. The point is that all states of mind with information content are experienced as
having the underlying state of pure consciousness at their basis. It is as if the qualia-rich content
of experience is superimposed on a content-free state at its basis, similar to the way that quantum
excitation content in a quantum field theory is supported by its vacuum state. 
Despite being able to enter states where external awareness is not supported, as in deep sleep, or
where the sense of identity and objects perceived may seem vague and obscure, as in dreams,
consciousness in the waking state constantly maintains a sense of subjective identity, or ‘self’,
and associated senses of ‘being and time’. These constitute the essence of experience, and should
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be considered principle attributes of what Damasio26 calls, ‘The Core Self’. Such a perspective is
in  distinct  contrast  to  Merleau-Ponty  who treated  sense-perception  as  the  prime  attribute  of
consciousness4, rather than core awareness, of which he apparently knew little.
From this article’s perspective, identification of a new form of information supporting subjective
experience, David Chalmers’s work6,27 offers a crucial justification, for he identifies properties
that any physical theory should necessarily satisfy. Two concern the internal structure of any
theory. He observes, first, that all reductive approaches to explaining experience have failed, and
that therefore a (physically speaking) non-reductive theory must be required; and, second, that
since  known  forms  of  information  do  not  seem  to  support  experience,  a  special  kind  of
information  is  needed,  one  with  a  second,  dual aspect,  specifically  linking  it  to  subjective
experience.  As  the  main  sections  of  this  article  demonstrate  in  detail,  complexity  based
information states possess precisely these properties. 
Another source of fundamental thinking is Bernard Baars28 who, prior to Chalmers’s entry into
the field, pointed out that experience comprises highly different categories, all of which coexist
in a coordinated way. At a party, one can stand balanced on one foot, hold a drink, enjoy the
aroma of the food, admire a woman’s dress, and hold an animated conversation, all at the same
time. Any theory of experience should be able to support such a diversity of inputs and outputs.
For this  he developed a theory of an overarching structure called the ‘Global  Workspace of
Consciousness’. 28
Giulio Tononi29 similarly  emphasizes that the structure of information in experience must be
highly integrated, so that different objects in the field of perception can be experienced by the
same subject, rather than by a seeming diversity of subjects. Tononi’s requirement is not far from
the perspective of Kant30, who, to counter the objections from Hume, used the perception of
objects as ‘wholes’ to justify the concept of self. The new information states do indeed support
an integrated information theory, in which Kant’s point is also upheld. 
The work of Penrose, Chalmers, Baars and Tononi all set conditions on the kind of information
structure required to support experience. Their requirements are related. Any system 
(1) exhibiting sufficient coherence (Penrose11), 
(2) will be non-reductive (Chalmers27), 
7
(3) will potentially provide a Global Workspace (Baars28), and
(4) can only support integrated information (Tononi29). 
The  original  suggestion  that  internal  coherence  is  a  precondition  for  consciousness  was  by
Domash31, but both his suggestion and Penrose’s11 were rejected on the grounds that quantum
coherence cannot be stabilized at room temperature. This article’s solution, critical  instability
coherence, does not suffer from that drawback. 
The  closest  proposal  to  that  given  here  has  been  by  Crick  and  Koch32 who  suggested  that
feedback loops hold the key, but did not make the extension to feedback instabilities. No one else
appears to have investigated the idea developed here33, feedback instability. Interestingly, Crick
and Koch specifically indicated loops formed by thalamo-cortical and cortico-thalamic tracts, for
which a suggested application of their critical instabilities34 is summarized in the subsection on
criticality in signaling pathways. 
Here we suggest that deeper properties of neuronal networks in brain cortices must be utilized,
their  well  attested  states  of  criticality.  35 As  detailed  in  the  next  section,  critical  feedback
instabilities  are  rife  in  biological  regulatory  systems,  for  reasons  hypothesized,  but  not  yet
proved: they appear to maximize information diversity36,  optimize function and regulation of
function.  37 Any theory based on critical  instabilities  will  be fully  ‘embodied’  in biology, as
Merleau-Ponty4 required, and Varela and colleagues have explained. 38
COMPLEXITY BIOLOGY 
Complexity biology has evolved over the past half century, largely due to the impetus given by
the work of Stuart Kauffman39, and one or two others such as the Danish physicist, Per Bak40, 41
and US theorist, John H. Holland. 42 Its significance is only slowly becoming appreciated, and it
does not yet have the place in elementary biology textbooks that it undoubtedly deserves. That,
however, is slowly beginning to change. In 2014, President of the Royal Society, Sir Paul Nurse
wrote in Cell43, ‘For future understanding of biology,  we have to get to grips with complexity.’
Indeed, there is probably far greater richness lying hidden in complexity than Nurse or even
Kauffman have yet begun to suspect. For those not familiar with it, a summary of complexity’s
essential concepts is now presented, together with a novel, but simple way of estimating their
significance. As will be seen, they cast biology in a completely new light. 
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Kauffman’s original studies39 were of patterns of connectivity between loops of genes expressed
in  genetic  networks,  identifying  which  patterns  might  produce  possible  kinds  of  cell.  His
conclusion was that genetic networks can only produce the kind of pattern of cell types observed
in organisms, if each expressed loop of genes coordinates with the expression or repression of an
average of two other loops of genes. Smaller coordination values produced uninteresting static
possibilities, larger values produced chaos. Genetic networks, Kauffman suggested, function at
‘The  Edge  of  Chaos’.  This  started  him  on  his  subsequent  half  century’s  investigations  of
complex biological systems, culminating in his current interests and insights recounted in the
central sections of his Prologue to this volume12 together with Arran Gare.
Some twenty  years  after  Kauffman’s  initial  contributions,  Per  Bak and  his  colleagues  were
studying unusual fractal distributions of response40 found in many physical systems. They came
to the conclusion that such distributions would only be possible if the system comes to rest at the
edge  of  instability.  The  classic  example  of  such  instability  is  a  slope  to  which  objects  are
continually being added44, either coming to rest or stimulating the start of avalanches large or
small. Examples include cinder cone volcanoes like Japan’s Mt Fuji, avalanche slopes of freshly
falling snow, piles of sand being freshly sieved on building sites, or the piles of tiny crystals in
egg-timers44; in all cases, the randomly falling bodies maintain the slope at an almost constant,
‘critical’, value. Below the critical value, the slope is stable, and the falling bodies add to the
pile, increasing the angle of the slope. At the critical value itself, avalanches of unpredictable
size take place. The critical value for the slope therefore represents a ‘critical instability’, with a
radical difference between behaviors at smaller values and larger ones. Slopes with angles above
the critical value tend to avalanche until the angle of the slope decreases to its critical value,
while slopes below the critical value tend not to avalanche until the critical value is reached.
Instability dynamics thus spontaneously organize the slope to maintain its critical value; hence
the name, ‘self-organized criticality’. 40
‘Edge of Chaos’ and ‘Self-Organized Criticality’ are closely connected. Avalanches are chaotic
responses, so a system in an apparently stable, or semi-stable, state of self-organized criticality,
is literally at ‘The Edge of Chaos’. The question then arises, ‘What sort of patterns emerge from
the chaotic responses produced at criticality?’ The answer is the (1/f) distributions of response,
which Per Bak’s work40 originally set out to understand. The term ‘(1/f) distribution’ means that
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the size of the response is inversely proportional to the frequency, f, of its occurrence. In models,
like  those  mentioned  above,  size  of  response  to  a  fixed  stimulus  is  strictly  random  and
unpredictable, in strong contrast to normal mechanical systems, which produce fixed responses
to fixed stimuli. 
Complexity biology brings into question whether we should consider biological systems merely
‘mechanical’ systems. This obviously shocking statement iswell based: mechanical systems are
expected to give fixed responses to fixed stimuli, but this property no longer holds for complex
biological systems, which give highly variable responses to fixed stimuli. This offers the seed of
an idea which will be taken up in the discussion section, in light of all presented results: in light
of  the  ability  of  complex  biological  systems  to  support  subjective  experience  based  on  the
information  properties  of  states  of  regulation  at  criticality,  we  should  stop  classifying  such
systems as merely mechanical. 
Extensive  research  has  since shown that  biological  systems often maintain  a  parameter  at  a
specific  value  by  using  the  principle  of  self-organized  criticality.  45 Examples  abound,
particularly  in  nervous  systems,  where  neuronal  nuclei  often  give  (1/f)  distributions  of
response46, indicating that the system’s natural state of rest is one of self-organized criticality. It
is now apparent that self-organized criticality is found far more widely in biological systems than
one would expect by chance,  almost universally.  The principle  seems to have some inherent
advantage requiring elucidation.  
Postulated Reasons for Self-Organized Criticality
Implicit in Nurse’s urging his fellow biologists to ‘get to grips with complexity’43 is the message
to find substantial  reasons why biological systems should adopt the principle so widely. The
person one would most expect to have some answer to this question is Stuart Kauffman, for he
has thought about the question longer than anyone. His papers contain suggestions, based on
computer modeling, that it maximizes information diversity36 and information processing. 47
In my own work, I arrived at the conclusion that, by maintaining switching processes close to
criticality, regulatory systems can avoid unwanted switching blockages, and improve sensitivity
of their switching processes.37 How is that possible, you may ask? 
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Criticality in Complexity Biology
In complex biochemical systems involving biochemical pathways, switching processes such as
epigenetic switching of a gene from ‘On’ to ‘Off’, or vice-versa,  immediately produce large
changes  in  the  numbers  of  molecules  in  biochemical  reactions  connected  to  the  enzyme(s)
produced from the gene. An abrupt change in the density of a particular chemical in a complex
system is analogous to a phase transition in a simple system like pure water, or any other pure
chemical. Ergo: switching processes may be modeled by phase transitions. 
Abrupt  responses  would  lack  sensitivity,  however.  They  would  also  suffer  from difficulties
common  to  all  phase  transitions48,  where,  rather  than  changing  phase,  a  system  enters  a
metastable state of the inappropriate phase. Such an eventuality would cause biological systems
difficulties. If physical parameters in a cell demand a regulatory response, but no phase change
occurs because the system has entered a meta-stable state of the wrong phase, then the regulatory
response  required  for  appropriate  function  has  failed,  compromising  organism  health,  and
possibly decreasing chances of survival. 
In contrast, when genetic switching processes are maintained close to, or at the phase transition
critical point, two advantages accrue: first, the system will always respond smoothly to demands
for  more enzyme;  second, close to  a  phase transition critical  point,  no metastable  states  are
possible48, so switching processes cannot be blocked. An example of the first is hormesis49, a
common  phenomenon  where  a  tiny  amount  of  toxin  stimulates  production  of  more  of  the
enzyme, the active site of which has been blocked. With regard to the second point, it can be
used to construct models of ill-health: when the strain of ongoing function moves the locus of
control away from criticality,  poor regulatory response to environmental demands becomes a
possibility. Failure of required system responses represents a compromise of healthy function37 –
i.e.  a  degradation  of  system  ‘health’.  In  this  sense,  poor  regulation  represents  poor  health
(correspondingly, improving regulation improves health). 
These considerations lead to a very simple suggestion for the reason for the observed ubiquity of
self-organized  criticality  and  accompanying  (1/f),  fractal  physiology  patterns  of  response  in
biological systems of all kinds. Criticality represents a form of optimized function, in particular
optimized regulation36, which may be used to give a scientific definition of system ‘health’.
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How could this have come about in the course of evolution? Here the work of John H. Holland
on  complex  adaptive  systems42 offers  key  inputs.  Complex  adaptive  systems  continuously
explore ways to improve their level of success in their ecological niche, co-evolving along with
other  niche  members  as  they  do  so.  Any  factor  that  improves  function,  such  as  improved
regulatory response, will naturally make an organism more successful, and will tend to be slowly
‘selected’  in  succeeding  generations.  On this  basis,  states  of  improved  function  will  slowly
manifest. As organisms co-evolve with other niche members, forms of optimized function will
act  as  attractors.  If  criticality  optimizes  regulation,  self-organized  criticality  will  tend  to  be
adopted as a mode of system operation – almost inevitably. 
In  biological  systems,  complex  or  otherwise,  regulation  is  therefore  of  extreme  importance.
Environmental pressures tend to favor organisms that function more efficiently in their niche,
particularly  ones that  are  better  regulated.  One strategy to  improve regulation  is  to  improve
sensitivity of response to environmental changes. Consider the example of epigenetic switching,
changing a gene from being down-regulated to up-regulated, or vice versa. The simple picture of
epigenetics is of a gene either being switched On, or switched Of’, with an abrupt change from
one  state  to  the  other  represented  by  a  phase  transition.  The  requirement  of  sensitivity  of
response suggests that the locus of control of gene expression would be better situated at a place
where a smooth transition is possible, suggesting that the phase transition critical point should be
the preferred locus of control of the switching process. 
Criticality as a Condition on Regulation
The  theory  of  regulation  is  due  to  mathematician  Norbert  Wiener.  50 Wiener  identified  the
foundation of regulation as loops of information flow by which a controller receives information
and transmits appropriate  instructions (also a form of information)  back to the system being
controlled.  Such  loops  are  known  as  feedback  loops.  The  key  quantitative,  mathematical,
concept in a feedback loop is its feedback gain  g: the ratio of signal strengths for successive
passes of a signal round the loop. The gain g must be less than one, g < 1, so that the signal dies
away, for patterns of information in the loop to remain stable, otherwise they will grower larger,
potentially without limit.  As  g approaches  1 from below, a form of instability results: critical
feedback instability. 
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The question then  arises,  could there be circumstances  in  which  this  kind of  g =  1,  critical
instability  could play the role of a criticality  form of instability  in complexity biology? One
answer is when the feedback loop is used as a feedforward loop to amplify signals on a signaling
pathway. The amplification, A, produced by a feedforward loop is given by 
A = (1/(1 – g))
This increases without limit as the loop’s feedback gain, g, approaches the value 1 from below.
When the feedback gain round a loop is close to the value for critical feedback instability, the
feedforward loop can make the system far more responsive to small input signals. Is it surprising
then, that such loops are found on all biochemical, signaling pathways, exocrine, endocrine and
cytokine? Interestingly, the ubiquity of such signaling pathway loops throughout biology was the
topic  of  a  previous  article  by Nurse51,  a  perspectives  contribution  to  Nature.  Although their
specific  function  has,  in  most  cases,  not  been  proved,  any  cell  signaling  system could  use
criticality  on  such  loops  to  improve  responsiveness,  i.e.  regulatory  function.  Improving
responsiveness will improve regulation and function, and lead to increasing organism success,
and  self-selection.  That  is  certainly  a  reasonable  starting  hypothesis  to  ‘get  to  grips  with
criticality’. 
The physics of criticality is therefore of fundamental importance to biology. As we shall see, it is
fundamental to the new approach to phenomenology suggested in this article. The next sections
explain  it  in  more  detail,  from two  perspectives,  that  of  feedback  loops  and  that  of  phase
transitions leading to a new, unexpected aspect of criticality: properties of its information states,
analysis of which presents a completely new dimension to the study of information, the new kind
of information at the heart of this article. 
Criticality on Signaling Pathways
Signaling pathways present another aspect of regulation where proximity to criticality becomes
the preferred state of the system. All complex biological systems contain feedback loops on their
signaling pathways, the function of which is apparently not yet understood.51 An obvious use
would be as feedforward loops to amplify incoming signals and so increase sensitivity of system
response. When a loop is operating at a gain g, the ratio of energies of the signal at successive
passes round the loop),  feedforward amplification  is  produced by the loop. The feedforward
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amplification is by a factor f proportional to (1/(1 – g)).  In the limit,  g → 1- , tends to 1 from
below, this becomes increasingly large, increasing system sensitivity. 
Particular signaling pathways where such loops have been suggested as candidates to explain the
presence  of  subjective  awareness  are  those  between the  metathalamus  and brain  cortex32,  in
particular, the lateral geniculate nucleus on the visual pathway and the visual cortex, and the
medial geniculate nucleus on the auditory pathway and the auditory cortex. In both cases, the
existence of both thalamo-cortical tracts transmitting incoming signals from the thalamus to the
cortex, and cortico-thalamic tracts, transmitting feedback signals from the cortex to the thalamus,
create feedback loops with the ability to create considerable amplification. Were the gain  g to
surpass  its  critical  value,  1,  an  internally  generated  signal  would  result,  with  interesting
implications for sense perception. 34
Long-term  practitioners  of  self-transcending  systems  of  meditation24 exhibit  unusually  low
auditory thresholds52, accurate measurement often requiring recalibration of audiometers. This
can be understood in terms of increased gain round the feedback loops between metathalamic
nuclei and sensory cortices.34 If the gain g round the loop on such a pathway should exceed 1, a
self-generated  signal  would  result.  34 It  is  therefore  relevant  that  long-term  practitioners  of
eastern  meditation  systems  report  experiences  of  sound  (Aum)  and  light.  These  may  well
constitute evidence for criticality states on the feedback loops concerned. 
Such experiences are produced essentially by passive means. The meditation systems advocate
staying in states of mental silence, and only returning to practice of the instructed technique
when disturbances occur, internal or external. Criticality states on the feedback loops therefore
seem to be produced spontaneously by the system dynamics. They would appear to be governed
by self-organized criticality. 
These feedback loops on the auditory and visual pathways were the focus of Crick and Koch 32 in
their attempt to explain how consciousness arises within the brain. Our analysis suggests that
they did indeed identify crucial  components  of brain pathways activated  by those aiming to
experience pure consciousness, but that phenomena associated with such feedback loops are still
external to the experience of pure consciousness per se. Rather than supporting consciousness
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itself, they are concerned with refined aspects of sense perception, increasing sensitivity to entire
signals, and to specific aspects of signals. Most likely they are responsible for selective attention.
Criticality: The Mechanical Approach 
To understand critical instability, the means by which stability is maintained in physical systems
needs to be explained. All stable physical systems undergo mechanical oscillations in response to
external disturbances, caused by exchange of various kinds of thermal energy due to impacts of
energetic quanta of various kinds, photons, atoms and molecules etc. Such oscillations stabilize
the system, oscillating about a well defined mean, and returning it to that state when disturbed.
They are called the ‘normal modes’ of the system, and propagate as waves. Their presence is an
absolute requirement for a system’s local stability. They are its cause. System instability can then
be understood as due to failure of its normal modes. 
For example, sound waves stabilize local density in a liquid-gas system, while magnetic spin
waves stabilize local magnetic moments in magnetic systems. Instability occurs when the system
cannot propagate their stabilizing waves. It can be explained by the system’s inability to do so.
The physics explanation is that, as the critical instability is approached, the velocity of normal
mode waves, vnm, becomes zero48, vnm → 0.
For example, in a fluid, sound waves stabilize local values of density, and the velocity of sound,
vs, is given in terms of pressure, P, and density, ρ, by 
(vs)2 = (∂P/∂ρ).
At the critical point the graph of pressure against density is flat, so (∂P/∂ρ) is zero (equivalently
the compressibility (∂V/∂P), where V is the volume of a unit mass, becomes infinite), and sound
velocity vs becomes zero. Zero velocity sound waves cannot propagate, so they vanish. With the
vanishing of stabilizing oscillations, the density becomes unstable, and begins to undergo critical
fluctuations driven by the systems’ internal energy: the system still possesses the same number
of  internal  degrees  of  freedom,  which  support  thermal  energy  and  entropy,  but  its  internal
dynamics are now of a completely different kind, they are governed by ‘critical fluctuations’.48
In fluids, the highly fluctuating densities of critical fluctuations extend over scales that include
the  wave-length  of  light  (microns),  so  that  light  cannot  propagate  smoothly  through  them.
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Instead, it is scattered in the phenomenon known as ‘critical opalescence’48, making fluids near
their critical points opalescent in appearance, similar to the unusual scattering of light seen in
opals.  As  in  variable  (1/f)  responses  to  external  stimuli  in  complexity  biology,  the  right
experiments  would  show  critical  opalescence  to  have  its  scattered  light  photons  distributed
according to the (1/f) distributions characteristic of self-organized criticality.  
Another approach to explaining the disappearance of normal modes in critical systems is in terms
of  their  quantum properties,  because  they  form a  system of  quanta:  phonons  constitute  the
quantum form of sound waves in a fluid, and magnons the quantum form of magnetic spin waves
in a magnet. System normal modes can be quantized, and form quantum systems when forces
between particles obey Hooke’s law with its parabolic form of potential energy. Energy levels
are then equally spaced and can be considered to be occupied by a set of equal energy quanta (in
practice this is a little more complicated, but the end result is the same). 
Local structures of interparticle forces in terms of their potential energies offer a second kind of
explanation for normal mode failure, equivalent to the first, also useful to the theme. In normal
states  of a fluid,  interparticle  attractions  combine with core repulsion to produce an average
interparticle potential with a deep minimum, keeping particles in the liquid close together, but
insufficient to do so at higher energies in the gas, allowing them to remain far apart.  At the
critical instability, these tendencies balance, the effective potential develops a flat minimum. 
A flat minimum effectively makes the fluid infinitely compressible,  (∂V/∂P) → ∞., as stated
previously, implying that no waves can propagate.  However, a second way of looking at the
situation is to observe that with a non-parabolic effective potential, energy levels are no longer
equally spaced, and cannot be considered to be populated by a set of equal energy quanta. No
quantum field is possible. Instability can now be attributed to absence of a stabilizing quantum
field. 
Hooke’s law (and its analogues for various systems) and finite values of compressibility (and its
related analogues) are closely related. Despite looking so different, these two ways of explaining
how a system becomes unstable are equivalent. But Hooke’s law has provided an interesting
insight into instability at a microscopic level: failure of system quantizability, which is further
developed in the Results section A. 
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Properties of Criticality States 1: General Properties
Two seemingly different ways of considering criticality have been presented, either in terms of
switching processes considered as phase transitions, or as critical instabilities on feedback loops,
when the gain g approaches unity, and the system enters the region of a feedback / feedforward
instability. The first approach allows criticality states to be compared to critical instabilities at
the end points of a line of phase transitions for increasing temperature. This parallel is useful for
deriving thermodynamic properties, such as showing how their physics incorporates high levels
of long range correlations, making them non-reductive in a new way (Results Section B). The
second is useful to derive information properties, demonstrating that they carry Chalmers’ dual
aspect,  central  to  this  article  (Results  Section  C),  and  how  they  can  conduct  Penrose’s
orchestrated reduction, OR, of wave packets (Results Section A).
First, criticality in terms of phase transitions: below some ‘critical temperature’  Tc, two phases
can coexist, connected by a phase transition, while above the critical temperature, only a single
phase exists, so no phase transition is possible.  Examples of this kind of behavior, include the
liquid-gas and ferromagnetic phase transitions. The first ends in a liquid-gas critical-point for
which a theory, still taught in high-school physics, was developed in the 19th century by Van der
Waals. The second ends in a ferromagnetic critical point, studied by Pierre Curie (husband of
Marie  Curie)  for whom its  critical  temperature,  the Curie  temperature,  is  named.  Above the
Curie point, ferromagnets usually become paramagnetic. 
As the end point of a line of phase transitions is approached, the properties of the two phases
become more and more similar,  until  transitions  between the two can eventually  be brought
about by thermal fluctuations: the so-called ‘critical region’. In this regime, the material cannot
decide which phase it  should be,  and it  begins to  fluctuate  between the two possible  states,
generating ‘critical fluctuations’, which dominate system dynamics, and determine properties of
the material. 
Phase transitions are characterized by a discontinuous change in a variable, known as the system
‘order parameter’.  In liquid-gas phase transitions,  density changes discontinuously from high
density in the liquid, to low density in the gas; it constitutes the order parameter. Ferromagnets,
show relatively abrupt changes in internal magnetization as magnetic field direction is reversed
at zero magnetic field. As the critical point is approached the discontinuous change becomes
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smaller, eventually becoming smooth. In gas-liquid critical points at the critical values PC and
VC, the slope of the curve of pressure, P, against volume, V, (negative for an ideal gas, PV = RT)
becomes flat, (∂P/∂V)T = 0, where the subscript T indicates that the temperature is held constant,
in this case at T = TC. The velocity of sound in the fluid is characterized by (∂P/∂V), so when this
becomes zero, sound waves cannot propagate. They cannot function, and therefore cannot fulfill
their normal role in the fluid (i.e. ‘liquid’ or ‘gas’), which is to maintain the local stability of a
given unit volume of the fluid. The density of the fluid therefore becomes unstable, exhibiting
large  scale  fluctuations  – critical  point  fluctuations.  The phase  transition  approach therefore
corroborates the mechanical approach to explaining instability. 
In general, values of the order parameter in different phases are stabilized by specific kinds of
quanta, or quantum field: sound waves, or phonons, in a liquid or gas, and magnetic spin waves,
known as magnons, in magnetic systems. As the critical point is approached the value of the
order parameter becomes unstable and begins to fluctuate violently; it is no longer well-defined.
Large fluctuations in local values of the order parameter constitute the critical point fluctuations. 
Mechanical  systems  are  expected  to  have  well  defined  properties,  and  although  seemingly
mechanical reasons have been given for why a critical system has become unstable, namely the
velocity of the stabilizing quanta, vq, has become zero, vqcrit → 0, the system now fails to behave
like a mechanical system, in that a fixed stimulus no longer gives a fixed response. In the case of
liquid-gas critical  points, their highly irregular scattering of light called ‘critical  opalescence’
was known in the 19th century. Point: unlike mechanical systems which give fixed responses to
fixed stimuli,  and behave predictably, critical systems give highly variable responses to fixed
stimuli,  continuously  varying  in  time,  and  in  the  example  quoted,  giving  an  opalescent
appearance to scattered light. 
These preliminary observations on the effectively non-mechanical nature of critically unstable
systems are a double edged sword. They imply that biological systems at criticality should not be
considered  mere mechanisms.  Indeed,  fractal  physiology53 has documented  huge numbers  of
systems  where  system  response  to  stimuli  evokes  (1/f)  response  distributions,  which  are
therefore  not  fixed.  But  no  one  seems  to  have  pointed  out  that  this  simple  fact  denies
physiological systems the purely mechanical nature that has always been attributed to them. 
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But who has had the courage to ask the question, ‘Are there circumstances when a physiological
system might not be considered a purely mechanical system?’ The above answer seems (to this
author  at  least)  undeniable:  ‘When  the  system  is  at  criticality!’  This  means  that  no  well
functioning  complex  biological  system  should  be  considered  a ‘mere  mechanism’  (as  all
traditionally have been), because most if not all properly functioning physiological systems are
regulated from loci of control at criticality. 37
The second edge to the sword is that, if as this paper proposes, all states of subjective experience
are founded on systems at criticality, then no psychological test should be designed around the
assumption that it should yield fixed answers from the same person, nor that the variability in the
answers should obey normal distributions – they should obey (1/f) distributions and statistical
analysis should use the Sankaran index, not normal distributions and variances. In fact the basic
assumptions of behavioral psychology, that the mind is merely a mechanical system, obeying
laws of fixed responses to fixed stimuli, become patently false.  
RESULTS
A. Criticality and OR produced by Exact Self-Observation 
As we have seen above, from the perspective of quantum theory, the normal mode oscillations
responsible for system stability constitute a system of quantum fields in the medium concerned –
phonons in liquid-gas systems, and magnons in magnetic systems. System stability depends on
their presence, and their correct function. Should they disappear, stability cannot obtain. It turns
out that it is possible to explain the disappearance of the system of normal mode quantum fields
at critical instabilities purely in terms of feedback. When this is done, the criticality condition is
found to result in annihilation of all normal mode quantum fields – in other words criticality
produces Penrose’s so-called ‘Orchestrated Reduction’ (OR) of all normal mode wave packets. 
This new approach reasons that a loop with feedback gain,  g = 1, constitutes a perfectly self-
observing system, and attributes disappearance of the normal mode quantum fields to the state of
perfect self-observation. This means that the new reason for the disappearance of the system of
stabilizing quanta is particular to quantum theory, and can be formulated without reference to
classical physics i.e. mechanics, as was done in the last section.
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Let us therefore consider a control system with a feedback loop, as the feedback approaches its
critical value, i.e. the gain g approaches g = 1- from below. Clearly, information flowing round a
feedback loop means that each element of the loop is receiving information about itself. Not
exactly the information that left that element on its path round the loop, as long as g < 1; but as
the gain g approaches g → 1-, the information returning to the chosen point in the loop becomes
more and more exactly the information,  which left it.  This means that,  as the limit  g = 1 is
attained, the energy and information returning to that element of the system becomes exactly the
same as the energy and information that left  it  on the previous pass. This idea has a vitally
important consequence: at criticality a feedback loop can be considered to be making a very
special kind of observation of itself, an absolutely exact self-observation. Away from criticality,
for g < 1, the system is also self-observing, but it is not exactly self-observing. At criticality, on
the other hand, it is exactly and precisely self-observing, quantitatively speaking. Such a system
may be termed an ‘exactly self-observing system’. 
What  could  be  special  about  such  a  condition?  Enter  one  of  the  two  fundamental  laws  of
quantum theory as given in its most rigorous formulations: wave functions, or packets of wave
functions, or quantum fields, can undergo two fundamental kinds of change, Types I and II: 
 First, Type I change, which is discontinuous, when they are observed: ‘wave functions
collapse’; ‘wave packets, mixtures of wave functions, are reduced’; ‘quantum fields are
annihilated’. 
 Second, Type II, continuous change: wave functions, wave packets, and quantum fields,
evolve  in  time  according  to  their  equations  of  continuity,  such  as  those  
due to Schrodinger, Dirac, or various quantum field theories. 
The point we are making is that,  an act of exact observation in a feedback loop constitutes a
Type I quantum process, and will therefore annihilate all quantum fields in the system including
those of the stabilizing normal modes. 
Evidently, normal mode quanta in feedback loops experience this condition in modified form.
They are not annihilated when feedback gain, g, is far from unity: g < 1. However at g = 1, when
all energy and information pass round the feedback loop completely unchanged, it seems entirely
reasonable  to  propose  that  the  state  of  the  system  has  created  a  sufficiently  exact  act  of
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observation to annihilate all quantum fields within the system, and that this represents a purely
quantum explanation for why the system has become unstable, without reference to mechanics:
Information arriving at each point in the system is exactly the same as the information which
departed.  Regarded  as  an  information  transmitting  system,  a  feedback  loop  with  g =  1  is
undergoing a process of perfect self-observation. According to the stated law of quantum theory,
such a process of exact or perfect self-observation will destroy all quanta within the system. 
To summarize: as a feedback loop’s feedback gain, g, approaches g = 1-, the entire feedback loop
becomes subject to a process of exact self-observation; normal mode quanta are annihilated; they
can no longer exist in the system, and with their disappearance, instability results. This presents a
completely new, purely quantum, explanation for feedback instability, which can immediately be
taken as one of its fundamental properties.
What is important in the current context is that this explanation for instability offers a radical
new explanation for Penrose’s orchestrated reduction (OR) of wave packets. 21 Penrose realized
that reduction of quantum wave packets requires a highly non-linear theory, and, being expert in
quantum approaches to gravity, he knew that they offer non-linearities. His mathematical physics
is unquestioned, but many find the source of his explanation far-fetched. 
Feedback  loops  are  classic  examples  of  non-linear  processes.  At  feedback  instability,  their
physics is entirely non-linear. They offer a highly appropriate source of non-linear physics to
explain orchestrated reduction (OR) of quantum wave packets in biological systems. Critical
feedback  instabilities  with  their  evident  property  of  perfect  self-observation  round  the  loop
constitute  singular  self-observing  systems.  The process  of  perfect  self-observation  at  g = 1,
collapses  all  wave functions,  reduces all  wave packets,  annihilating all  normal mode quanta.
Resorting to quantum gravity is not needed. Non-linearity at criticality in feedback physics as
exemplified in complexity biology is quite sufficient. 
This analysis of feedback loop criticality can be applied to critical instabilities in any system. A
fundamental  characteristic  of  instability  in  all  critical  systems,  including the  thermodynamic
examples  in  fluids  and magnets  discussed  in  the  previous  section  is  non-linearity.  All  such
critical  systems are  par example non-linear  systems. Any critical  instability  can be similarly
understood as a physical condition where the mathematics of the system is no longer linear, but
21
has become non-linear: completely self-interacting i.e. perfectly self-observing. Such systems are
also effectively in states of perfect self-observation and normal mode quantum fields responsible
for maintaining the system’s local stability  are destroyed by the non-linearity.  As above, the
accepted law of quantum theory that acts of observation ‘collapse wave functions’ then applies:
the non-linearity reduces all quantum wave-packets, destroying all quantum fields in the system.
This suggests a new law of physics: pure non-linearity annihilates quantum fields. 
Conclusion:  in  a  perfectly  self-observing  system,  stabilizing  quantum fields  are  annihilated.
Equivalently, non-linearity in any essentially non-linear system effectively results in a process of
self-observation, removing stabilizing quantum fields, and producing instability. 
B. Information Properties of Criticality States 
That criticality states possess information properties may not seem obvious, but a general line of
reasoning  based  on  entropy  shows  that  they  must.  Information  and  entropy  are  opposite54,
information being negative entropy. Every excitation in material systems contributes to system
entropy and can be assigned an information value. Since criticality states possess definite values
of entropy, they can also be assigned a corresponding measure of information.  Normally,  in
microscopic systems this is measured in terms of quantum information, but as we have seen,
criticality states are not quantum systems, so the theory of quantum information does not apply.
Systems at criticality possess a completely different kind of information.  This section and the
next  elucidate  its  structure,  one  which  is  so  different  as  to  be  completely  new,  requiring
development  in  stages:  first,  in  this  section,  considering  critical  correlations  and  their
consequences. 
B1.  Correlations19:  As  explained  previously,  critical  instabilities  possess  high  levels  of  long
range internal  correlations.  Under normal  conditions,  the degree of correlation C(r)  between
system elements separated by a distance r varies as 
C(r) α r-(d-2+η) Exp(-r/ξ) 
= r-(d-2+η) when ξ → ∞
where η is a critical exponent. This decreases exponentially with r/ξ, where ξ is the ‘range’ of the
correlations.  48 As the critical point is approached, ξ tends to infinity, the range of correlations
becomes infinite. Correlations become long range, every system element is correlated with every
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other element according to the power law, r-(d-2+η), to an extent not present in ordinary quantum
systems  i.e.  microscopic  systems  not  at  critical  points.  (This  represents  a  different  kind  of
correlation from those in systems of identical particles, because it is not just particles that are
correlated but their dynamics.)  Critical correlations ‘span’ the entire system; no system element
is left out; no pair of system elements can be considered uncorrelated.  
Since  they  represent  a  form  of  internal  order,  critical  instability  correlations  lower  system
entropy, a property easily demonstrated from the mathematical form of entropy, S = - Tr{ρlnρ}.
Two important points follow: (a) correlation negative entropy provides a measure of negentropy
information in systems at criticality, a property to which we shall return later; (b) correlations
may be able to explain anomalously low entropies55observed in living organisms. 
Many years ago two physicists postulated that states of experience should contain high levels of
internal  correlations,  Domash31 in public  lectures  in the 1970’s, and Penrose20 in the 1980’s.
Their ideas were rejected on the grounds that long range quantum correlations cannot exist at
room temperature. Naturally high levels of quantum correlations are a feature of certain special
kinds of low temperature quantum system such as superconductors and superfluids, and depend
on low temperatures (-260 to -270oC) for their existence. Being due to system instability, critical
point correlations are distinct from them. Unlike low temperature quantum correlations, they are
generated by instability and are necessarily stable at temperatures at which instability occurs.
The difficulty is overcome. The Domash-Penrose hypothesis is supported. 
Low organism entropies55: in the 1960’s, many organisms were observed to have anomalously
low entropy levels, but the phenomenon was never understood and seems to have been virtually
forgotten. The lowering of entropy at criticality in phase transitions, which can be attributed to
the long range correlations and high internal coherence at criticality offers a possible qualitative
explanation:  organism entropy is decreased by criticality states’ internal coherence, a point of
significance, not yet stated in complexity biology. 
B2.  Non-reductive27:  Correlations  between system states  destroy their  independent  existence.
Quantum correlations, and other properties of quantum systems compromise their reducibility.
However, critical correlations are so extended, and so inclusive, that they create macroscopic
levels of system integration that quantum systems do not exhibit. Long-range correlations make
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systems at criticality so highly correlated as to be non-reductiveto a new level, a key property for
subsections B3 and B4. 
This can be illustrated as follows, quantum physics expresses states of multicomponent systems
as  sums  and  products  of  states  of  system  components.  A  system  with  two  components
represented by ψ1 and ψ2 might in some specific case be represented by Ψ12 = ψ1ψ2. However
many components a quantum system may have, its  states can be constructed out of sums of
products  of  fields  representing  those  component,  is  expressible  in  terms  of  them.  States  of
quantum systems may be said to be constructible out of its components, and in that limited sense,
reducible to them. Mathematically, states of a quantum system form a special kind of vector
space known as a Hilbert space, members of which can be expressed as a linear combination of
its basis vectors, and in that sense are ‘reducible’ to them. 
At a critical point this is no longer true. System states cannot be expressed as sums and products
of states of individual  elements within the system. They constitute  mixtures of an altogether
different level of complexity; Hilbert space basis vectors are no longer available; mathematically
they form Banach spaces, rather than Hilbert spaces, and are irreducible to a new degree. 
B3.  Integrated  Information29:  In  quantum  theory  wave  functions  like  ψ1 and  ψ2 represent
information states. 56 Information in a multicomponent system equals the sum of the information
contained  in  its  component  systems.  In  quantum  theory,  correlations  reduce  the  amount  of
entropy in systems containing two or more sources, and so increase the information content to
yield a picture of a single integrated system. When correlations in a complex quantum system are
high enough, they integrate information about its subsystems into a single picture. 
At instabilities, the high levels of long range correlations automatically mean that information
content  of  all  their  various  component  structures  are  correlated:  the  result  is  an  integrated
information theory, no special conditions need be invoked to achieve it. Tononi’s proposal29 is
automatically realized.
B4.  Global  Workspace28:  Baars’  concept  of  a  global  workspace  is  related  to  integrated
information, but not limited to a single sense, or a single kind of activity. Once again, the high
levels of correlation that exist between different, widely separated components of a system at
criticality result in their forming a single overarching structure. 
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In this way, the long-range, system spanning correlations in criticality physics enable the system
to support an overall information space, in which to represent activities of all elements perceived
in external  reality.  Such correlations  can unify different  channels  of perception,  thought  and
feeling into a single perceptual and felt reality. Integrated overall information states register all
channels in the mind simultaneously in an overall Global Workspace for Consciousness. 
The above properties of criticality based information states, B1-B4, are summarized in Table 2.
They show how long range criticality correlations endow critical instabilities with the properties
hypothesized for states of conscious experience by recent philosophers and scientists. Next we
consider the structure of information at criticality. 
C. Structure of Information in Criticality States
This section contains the key derivation of the whole paper: Chalmers’ second requirement6,27,
dual aspect information pertaining to ‘self’, is demonstrated for critical instability excitations.
From the new kind of information, experience information, depicted in Figure 1, we are able to
derive the three properties proposed by phenomenology’s founders, Husserl and Heidegger. The
dual aspect is the most important property developed here because no information state currently
being used by those in the Tucson approach to phenomenology has a dual aspect. Hameroff and
Penrose assume that  it  is  sufficient  to use quantum information,  which they propose for the
proteins in cells’ cytoskeletons. That may well be appropriate for information in memory waiting
for retrieval, but is not appropriate for information in cognitive states. 
The easiest way to establish a dual aspect for the structure of information states at criticality is to
use fluid  flow vectors  in  viscous systems as  an  illustrative  example.  In  fluids,  flow vectors
represent a kind of information, so fluid flow vectors are analogous to information vectors. At
the  boundary  between  smooth  laminar  flow  and  turbulence,  where  the  Reynolds  number
becomes critical, they exhibit instabilities. Turbulence consists of vortices, vector loops. At the
critical instability leading to turbulence, vortices want to form, but cannot quite do so: each flow
vector <===== may be considered to have one or more infinitesimal vector loops attached to it
<=====O,  each infinitesimally  altering  the vector’s  direction:  the flow vectors  thus  become
unstable, and consist of mixtures of vector states.
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These properties carry over into information properties of quantum fields of normal modes as a
critical  point  is  approached:  the  quantum  field’s  quantum  information  vectors  gain  similar
vortex-like loops at criticality, i.e. they become quantum information mixtures, held together by
infinitesimal  information  loops.  The  information  vectors  have  assumed  dramatically  altered
properties:  as depicted in Figure 1, they have become vector mixtures with infinitesimal attached
information loops, a vector bundle <===== with an added information loop: O. The effect of the
state of perfect self-observation of the critical,  g = 1, feedback loop is to incorporate itself into
the structure of the information state itself to yield, <=====O, a new kind of information state. 
Figure 1: The Structure of Information States at Criticality
<===== + O  <=====O
Figure 1 Caption: Figure 1 depicts the information properties of excited states
of systems at criticality. They exhibit two aspects, an irreducible vector mixture
representing information content, and a ‘dual aspect’ consisting of a loop of
information flow, with the property of perfect self-observation. 
The proposed <=======O structure is unique to criticality states, and yields an entirely new
kind of information theory. Its information structure is completely different from, and unrelated
to, the digital information that we are used to in information technology. 
But what kind of information might the new, <=======O, structure represent? What function
might  the loop fulfil?  We  propose that  the effect  of  the loop is  'to register  the state’s own
existence’.  As  such  it  may  begin  to  explain  an  essential  aspect  of  experience,  one  that  no
previous mathematical model has been able to attempt: the sense of self that accompanies all
experience. We propose that this property is not merely analogous to a person ‘being aware of
their own presence’ throughout experience of waking state activity, like sense perception, rather
the newly identified loop within the structure of the information states represents the mechanism
by which self-awareness is maintained during perception, thought, decision making etc.
Note however, it is important to realise that the proposed connection between the loop in the
information  state  and the  sense  of  self  in  awareness  is  an  hypothesis.  The  existence  of  the
attached loop in the information states is not in question. Rather its application to describing
experience  requires  an  intuitive  leap,  which  forms  the  hypothesis:  the  information  loop
transforms  the  information  state  from  a  merely  objective  state  of  information  into  one  of
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subjective  experience33,  i.e.  it  constitutes  a  dual  aspect transforming  the  state’s  information
content into an act of phenomenal experience. 
If this hypothesis is valid, the loop represents the source of subjectivity in biological information
states used to support experience. In support of this, note that reducing the state’s information
content to zero reduces the state to one of pure self-knowledge – the traditional definition of the
word ‘consciousness’ in most mid-20th century dictionaries.  To expand this  point,  the model
<=======O,  represents  information  in  experience,  or  ‘experience  information’.  Of  this
structure, the loop by itself, <O, represents a state of pure self-knowledge, i.e. the ‘self’, on top
of which any information content from sense perception or thought is actively super-imposed. In
the proposed model of experience, the ‘self’ is therefore represented by a process, a singular loop
of information flow, a singular process. The special significance of this here is that Denis Noble
has proposed as one of his ‘Principles of Systems Biology’ that ‘the self is a process’. 57 The
model qualifies this to: the ‘self’ is a singular process, an information loop at criticality.
The means by which such a ‘self’ registers information is very subtle and may not seem obvious.
What the model offers is a set of states with various degrees of excitation of different kinds,
analogous to, but different from, a set of excited states in a quantum field theory. The state of
least excitation, analogous to a quantum vacuum state (but with additional properties) is the state
of pure self-awareness, <O. Its excited states, <======O, represent states of awareness with
information  content  from  sources  such  as  sense  perception,  treated  by  Merleau-Ponty.  By
integrating information from thought, memory or perception, <=======, into its foundational
structure,  <O,  the  information  becomes  registered  in  experience  as  <======O.  In  eastern
thought,  it  is  sometimes  stated  that,  ‘the  self  takes  on  the  form  of  experience-content’,  a
statement that supports the picture given by <O → <======O as a model for registration of
information in experience by means of pure self-awareness gaining information content. 
A singular process, <O, is not an ordinary process. The model endows the ‘self’ with properties
different from any hitherto conceived possible in physical, chemical or biological sciences. The
proposed structure of information states at criticality in Figure 1 represents the possibility of a
radical new departure in scientific thought.
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To those who find the hypothesis acceptable, or who are inclined to examine it further (a matter
of personal taste or judgment), a whole new field may become describable by scientific theory,
and eventually a candidate for inclusion in scientific knowledge. The hypothesis thus represents
an induction of the kind needed to open up a new field of science; without which no radically
new field of science can emerge in the possible scheme of intellectual things, and maybe become
established. The question is not whether, on seeing it for the first time, it seems logical, it cannot,
for logic is always merely the handmaid of deductive reasoning. The question is rather whether it
fits, whether in some way it ‘feels right’ – whether the new pattern that it offers, provides a
beautiful enough fit to the body of phenomena laid out for explanation by, or inclusion in, the
overall theory. That it may offer a means to represent a mathematical model of self-knowledge
and experience is a small first step
Now consider the other two phenomenological properties2,3: the inherent sense of continuity of
time passing, of ‘Being in Time’; the inherence of time in experience. The model supports this,
because circulation of information round the loop is not a thing, rather it is a process. Again, it is
an intuitive step to make the hypothesis that such a loop process can give rise to an internal sense
of continuity interpolating between, and connecting successive events that come to experience.
Once this is accepted, the model is seen to give rise to the sense of continuity in experience –
Being in Time – in addition to a sense of self. In other words, the model seems to correctly
predict that our ‘internal time consciousness’2 is inherently embedded in our sense of ‘self’. 
Time is  an intrinsic  aspect  of self-awareness.  Time is  not  discontinuously experienced,  as it
would have to be, if only consciously experienced events were able to effect its registration, as in
most current neurophysiological models. The apparent continuity of our subjective experience of
time then becomes evidence in favour of the model, subliminal registration of information of
short duration as in now illegal subliminal advertising, notwithstanding. 
The sense of ‘self’, and the sense of the passing of time, combine to yield a ‘sense of our own
presence’,  which  can  also  be  taken  as  an  inherent  aspect  of  experience.  In  support  of  this,
remember that when our name was called out in a roll call in class at school and we replied,
‘Present!’,  our  response  affirmed  our  ‘sense  of  our  own presence’  in  class.  The  connection
between that and being present in the sense of being here, now, i.e. ‘being in time’, is an inherent
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aspect of our subjectivity. It is remarkable that the ‘experience information’ model seems to offer
a theoretical basis for how this happens. The inherent loop seems to ‘fit’ in many ways. 
In summary: At criticality, states of materials are unrecognizably transformed. In many cases
they  do  not  even  appear  to  be  similar  to  those  of  the  underlying  material.  They  exhibit
completely different physics from that of the original stable matter. Phenomenology and modern
consciousness studies both identify properties of ‘experience’, which differ from those of the
material world of perception. One possible perspective is that the two are so different, that two
entirely  different  kinds  of  physical  theory  should  be  used  to  describe  them.  The physics  of
instability,  critical  phenomena,  and  the  physics  of  stability,  whether  classical  or  quantum
physics, are sufficiently different to fulfill this. The physics of stability is supported by normal
mode quantum fields, which represent the defining aspect of matter as we know it. The physics
of instability, of criticality in biology and singularity in the mathematics of control theory, when
understood in terms of singular information states with inherent feedback loops attached, may be
able to account for many different properties of experience – of phenomenology. 
D. Information Measures appropriate for Criticality States and their properties
D1. Negative Entropy of Correlations: Any information state must be assigned an appropriate
measure of information. Under B1 in Part  B, entropy reduction attributable to correlations was
noted as an appropriate measure of information since information represents order, while entropy
represents disorder. This implies that information in criticality states is somehow embedded in
their long-range correlations, which provide a measure for the information concerned. 
This seemingly simple answer only raises further questions: Does information associated with
the internal correlations of long-range coherence possess a digital representation? How can it be
used to perform calculations? How can information about the external environment be encoded
in it? These questions are answered in parts D2-4.
D2.  No Digital Representation11: If information is embedded in critical fluctuations, it must be
completely distinct from the usual kind of information that we are used to in modern information
technology,  the  digital  information58 conceived  by  Claude  Shannon.  Digital  information  is
represented in materially fixed structures, as magnetization of magnetic domains in hard disks, or
as the switching states of logic circuits in microchips. In either case, a material structure that can
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be switched between two states is employed, one state representing a ‘0’, while the other state
represents a ‘1’. 
In the case of critical correlations, no such rigid structures exist, so how could digital information
be embedded? Although a negative entropy information measure establishes a digital equivalent
for the information, it does not mean that the information is in digital form. Rather the opposite.
Being non-digital, information embedded in the system is of a completely different kind. 
Penrose was the first scientist to famously question whether information in consciousness obeys
the usual laws of information theory that limit most applications in information technology. In
‘The Emperor’s New Mind’11 he famously concluded that it does not, but was unable to prove his
case sufficiently well for a largely hostile scientific community to accept it. He did not explicitly
offer any alternative, like the criticality information states suggested here. 
Criticality states’ ability to support information as coherence information embedded in their long
range  internal  correlations  gives  a  first  clue  to  constructing  an  argument  that  establishes
Penrose’s thesis  directly  from a model  of  conscious experience.  The hypothesized  model  of
experience does not involve digital  information,  but information of a very different kind. As
shown  in  B3,  its  high  levels  of  internal  coherence  make  it  a  possible  form  of  integrated
information, holding together the perception of many objects into a single state of awareness.
This suggests that it also supports a completely different kind of representation of objects of
perception, where all parts of an object are integrated into perception of the object as a whole, a
gestalt. 
That we apprehend objects as wholes was first pointed out by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of
Pure  Reason30,  which  uses  the  idea  as  evidence  for  the  existence  of  the  self.  In  a  deeply
perceptive argument that was found very compelling, Kant suggested that the role of the ‘self’
was to hold together the various perceptions of different parts of an object, and to synthesize
them into  a  whole.  This  is  precisely  the  role  of  the  loop  O,  representing  the  ‘self’  in  the
experience  information  state,  <======O,  Kant’s deeply perceptive  insight  is  realized  in the
model. A suggestion for the neural process involved in such a synthesis is given below. It shows
that Kant’s argument in favor of the existence of the self, which he developed to counter David
Hume’s questions against it, can be put on a firm neurological basis. 
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D3.  Catastrophe Information33: Any theory of Gestalts suggests that object recognition during
perception involves matching the gestalt with a library of forms generated previously. Cognition
involves recognition.  Learning to recognize a new kind of object requires establishing a new
kind of form in the library of forms, which is used in the matching process – rather like learning
the meaning of a new word when learning to speak a language. It may take many repetitions of
the  word in  different  sentences  before  its  meaning is  correctly  incorporated  into  the  overall
gestalt  conveyed  by  the  phrase  or  sentence  containing  it.  But  how can  ‘forms’  be  directly
encoded without recourse to digital information? 
Enter the great French mathematician, Rene Thom. His Catastrophe Theory59 constitutes a study
of  singularities  generated  by non-linear  differential  equations.  Topologically,  singularities  of
various levels of complexity, such as the ‘fold catastrophe’ and the ‘butterfly catastrophe’, can be
created, each associated with objects or processes of various different kinds e.g. simple critical
points  for  the  first,  and ‘tricritical  points’  for  the  second.  Thom’s  ambition  was  to  use  his
singularities to show how morphogenetic processes occur during embryogenesis, but at that time
little  was  known  of  epigenetic  regulation;  rather  the  function  of  genes  as  repositories  of
information encoding proteins dominated biology. Genes encode proteins, but being self-folded
structures produced from linear chains of amino acids, proteins do not require Thom’s theory to
explain the emergence of their detailed. 
Epigenetics, the regulation of gene expression, is different. The complexity theory of genetic
networks  developed  by  Kauffman  makes  the  presence  of  Thom’s  catastrophe  singularities
inevitable in epigenetic processes. One of Noble’s current principles of systems biology57 is that,
‘there  is  no  genetic  program’.  The  corollary  is  that  ‘the  supposed  genetic  program  is  an
epigenetic program’. Regulation of gene expression is located at the edge of chaos; its criticality
states involve higher order critical points of arbitrarily high order, embodying catastrophes of
corresponding complexity.  An ordinary critical  point  contains a  fold catastrophe;  a tricritical
point14 contains  a  butterfly  catastrophe,  and  so  on.  Complexity  biology  can  incorporate
catastrophe theory into an epigenetic program directing successive stages of morphogenesis.
The details of which catastrophe is used at each stage of morphogenesis such as gastrulation now
requires  detailed  investigation;  specifically,  how  corresponding  non-equilibrium  biochemical
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processes of the kind identified by Ilya Prigogine in his ‘Order out of Chaos’ generate them. The
corollary to this realization is that complexity makes morphogenesis open to scientific theory. 
D4.  Criticality States as Cognitive States33:  Identification of states of experience as criticality
states automatically means that a library of forms becomes available to support gestalt cognition:
the various different catastrophes contained in higher order critical points, starting with the fold
catastrophe and butterfly catastrophe mentioned above. These can be modeled by networks of
neurons. In the 1970’s Stanley’s group investigated magnetic critical points of orders three14 and
four60, realizing that these were the start of a series of potentially unlimited complexity. 61,62 The
neural net-spin glass isomorphism63 means that each layer of the brain cortex can model critical
points of similarly unlimited complexity. Networks of neurons such as those in brain cortices are
therefore capable of supporting higher order critical  points of any higher order, meaning that
their catastrophes become available for use in the brain’s library of gestalt forms. 
Criticality states and their <======O information support gestalt cognition. They form the basis
for a new dimension of cognitive science with gestalt cognition in the central role, and gestalts
and their interrelationships playing central roles in both semantics and semiotics. This has an
important secondary implication: the central process in thinking is not logic; the primary process
is rather association. By that, brains naturally connect cognition through associated memories to
the next course of action. That is how skills are learned, and skill sets developed. 
D5.  Why Networks of Neurons were Adopted for Physiological Regulation: Genetic networks
are also capable of generating critical points of unlimited complexity. This suggests a reason for
the adoption of neuronal networks as regulatory systems in early phyla in the animal kingdom;
for example, in Nematoda, almost half the cells of C. Elegans are nerve cells. Even an organism
with  a  simple  cylindrical  form like  a  nematode  requires  quite  complex  catastrophes  for  its
morphogenesis. The role of a nervous system is to regulate processes in the organism’s various
tissues and cells.  Only a  neuronal network is  capable of modeling the different  catastrophes
present  in  cellular  genetic  networks;  neuronal  networks  are  uniquely  capable  of  regulating
organisms. That would seem be the reason why life adopted them for use in regulation.
DISCUSSION
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The new theory has implications for many different fields, not only phenomenology, information
theory, cognitive science, and neuroscience, as discussed in the last section. One example is that
it provides a definitive solution to Schrodinger’s famous cat paradox. Schrodinger objected to the
idea that even macroscopic entities could in principle be put in states of superposition, or as-yet-
undecided coexistence. He proposed his celebrated example of a cat, unobserved in a closed in a
closed container, that would be killed if a hydrogen cyanide capsule was broken triggered by a
random cosmic  event.  According  to  naive  quantum  theory,  the  cat  would  be  suspended  in
coexisting dead and alive states until observed by an external observer, which intuitively seems
unacceptable – paradoxical. Clearly the relationship between the quantum world and classical
world requires better  definition.  In the context  of the new theory of experience information,
where the self is able to reduce its own wave function, a cat is a perfectly self-observing system,
and would automatically go into one state or the other without the need for an external observer.
The paradox is solved. Various publications by Penrose also refer to the Cat Paradox, pointing
out that Orchestrated Reduction of wave packets solves the problem.
Criticality States and Phenomenology 1: Embodiment and Sense Perception
How may  criticality  states  fulfil  the  fundamental  points  made  by  phenomenology?  Clearly,
criticality states are well recognized states in biology, with evidence of many kinds for their
existence in biological control systems, particularly epigenetic cellular regulation, cell signalling
systems, and the various neuronal networks of cortices in central nervous systems. This means
that  Merleau-Ponty’s  requirement  of  embodiment4 is  automatically  fulfilled.  As  regards  his
emphasis on perception4, a few words are necessary to explain how information from external
perception enters such states. 
In his book, ‘Languages of the Brain’64, Karl Pribram emphasized that when information from
perception is registered in digital format of the surface of sensory cortices, like the visual cortex,
it  has not yet entered conscious experience.  It is held in such states by a process of ‘lateral
inhibition’, preventing it being scrambled by adjacent neuronal firing sequences. To transmit the
sensory  information  to  experience,  cortical  neurons  utilize  a  process  ‘inhibition  of  lateral
inhibition’,  which  results  in  the  spreading  of  the  information  all  over  the  cortex,  a  linear
transformation,  Pribram and  colleagues  developed  the  linear  transformation  idea  in  detail65,
because it explains why memories are not lost when large portions of the brain are destroyed.
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Memory seems to be retained in a form analogous to a hologram, spread all over the surface of
the  cortex.  In  holography,  holograms  are  created  by  a  linear  transformation,  the  Fourier
transform, which can also be used to read the hologram, because Fourier transforms are their
own inverse.
Perception uses cortical information states of both kinds. For processing information transferred
by the visual pathway from the retina to the visual cortex, prior to its registration in experience
the  brain  uses  digital  type format  reminiscent  of  a  television,  as  is  widely demonstrated  by
neuroscientists. Registration in experience is then effected by the inhibition of lateral inhibition64
linear transformation process. We propose that the ILI transform converts the information into a
cortical state at criticality, the form in which it is apprehended by conscious experience.  
Criticality states in brain cortices maintain entire layers of cortex at criticality, where sensory
information  is  represented  in  a  form  like  a  hologram.  The  linear  transformation  integrates
information  pertaining  to  each  sense.  This  provides  the  detailed  explanation  for  both  the
observations of integrated information by Tononi and his colleagues29,  and for Baars’ Global
Workspace28 with its integration of different classes of information pertaining to different senses
and activitiesinto a single richly connected pattern of experience. By this mechanism, cortical
criticality states informed by the action of inhibition of lateral inhibition on previously digital
information embody the experience of perception.  As to the question of how the self registers
such information, see the discussion in the Results section above. 
Criticality States and Phenomenology 2: Being and Time
A  striking  aspect  of  the  experience  of  time  is  its  smoothness.  Information  registration  in
conscious experience through inhibition of lateral inhibition occurs at discrete intervals, yet our
experience  of  time  seems continuous  and  smooth,  rather  than  jerky.  This  suggests  that  our
experience of time passing is upheld by a deeper mechanism than discrete updating of cortical
information states. Clearly digital cortical information states, like those used in pre-processing,
are purely static and cannot support a ‘sense of time passing’. The place to look is therefore the
new kind of information state with its attached loop <======O. The loop with its gain g = 1, is
continuously  circulating  information,  and with it  the  possibility  of  providing the  basis  for  a
smooth continuous experience of time, as Schwartz1first suggested. 
1Schwarz G. Private Communicaton.
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Experiences during meditation support this idea. Yoga texts declare that when all information
content in the mind has been eliminated, the meditator enters a state of ‘Amness’ (Asmita), in
which experience is purely of the sense of time passing. In the proposed model, elimination of
information content corresponds to an information vector mixture is reduced to <O, a pure loop.
The criticality information state model predicts that such experience is attributable to the loop.
Indeed, it is common to use the word ‘Being’ to describe such states, particularly when all sense
of individuality has dropped away, and the meditator’s experience has become purely one of
impersonal ‘Being’, as happens beyond the ‘Asmita’ state. All sense of personal individuality has
dropped away to leave an impersonal sense of pure existence – Absolute Being. 
Furthermore, if one asks what kind of ‘self’ is represented by the criticality state, <O, without
information content, one can only reply2 that it is totally abstract, and beyond the possibility of
qualification. No sense of individuality is attached to it, and no qualia can be ascribed to it. 
Its relationship to C.S. Pierce, whose semiotics concern the interpretation of perception, is more
subtle. Some may consider Pierce’s phaneroscopy,or totality of all possibilities in awareness66, a
significant  contribution  to  phenomenology.  However,  the state  of  pure awareness  is  prior  to
semiosis, making interpretations of its initial experience problematic, and requiring guidance by
a teacher well experienced in it.  As the ground for semiosis applied to its content, it is itself
devoid of semiotic activity. It cannot be constructed by semiotic means. This nullifies attempts,
such as ‘Cybersemiotics’18, to construct consciousness by semiotics. 
Personally, reflection on my own conscious experience and ability to respond to situations and
create influences I prefer in my environment, leads me to conclude that consciousness is a source
of order. As conscious beings, we are able to perceive order and disorder in our environment,
and where necessary create environments of our choice. We see patterns such as symmetries, and
derive abstractions of such patterns as in e.g.groups and other kinds of algebra in mathematics. 
In this sense, mathematics offers seemingly objective languages such as set theory or kinds of
categoryother than the category of sets to describe order of different kinds, involving various
kinds  of  relationships  –  sets,  algebras,  Calabi  Yau  spaces,  or  categories  themselves.  If  our
2As a teacher of meditation with over 40 years experience.
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consciousness can create order, it is natural to assume that mathematics of some appropriate,
possibly new, kind will be able to describe aspects of conscious experience. 
Popper considered mathematics a Class 3 inter-subjective activity (between subjects), distinct
from his Class 1 of objects, and class 2 of subjects. If mathematics can describe order of various
kinds, it should also be able to describe the kind of order within the world of matter that leads to
the possibility of Popper Class 1 and Class 2, I and Thou, subjects. However, it is not necessarily
able to describe awareness itself – since that is not objective. 
My knowledge of myself, I, as a subject, is subjective – by definition. In contrast my knowledge
of ‘Thou’ as a subject is limited by the degree to which I can couple to the ‘I’ that is you – that is
to ‘Thou’. If as a Yogi I can couple directly into your heart, I can know the ‘Thou’ that is you
more intimately than if I can only couple by speech, and other means involving external sense
perception. I can then create a deeper level of connection than if I am merely limited to eyes and
vision, or to ears and language.
In his review of work on phenomenological experience, Tegmark22 suggested that consciousness
should be considered a special state of matter that he wittily named, ‘perceptronium’. He briefly
remarked, ‘such an approach provides interesting links to condensed matter criticality’, but did
not elaborate further. We can complete his insight: Perceptronium is a state of criticality at the
apex of a biological regulatory system, controlling the entire organism. With one proviso: a state
of system instability, with excitations only loosely coupled to the underlying material, does not
really qualify as a ‘state of matter’; more appropriate would be to call it a ‘state of mind’. 
Mind versus Matter
In my personal experience mind and matter seem completely different. So much so that I feel
genuinely surprised when scientific colleagues disagree. Matter is characterized by permanence
of form, or in the case of a gas, of some aspect of its form, such as its density. In contrast, Mind
seems to me to be characterized by extreme flexibility; by the ability to adapt almost instantly to
any situation that arises, and make the most of new opportunities on offer. When it adapts its
direction  to  take  advantage  of  a  new opportunity,  mind  stands poised  in  a  state  of  internal
equilibrium,  ready to move in whatever  direction  is  most  appropriate  –  like  a  tennis  player
preparing to receive a service. 
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The physics  of  permanence  of  form i.e.  matter  requires  the  presence  of  stabilizing  physical
oscillations  –  describable  by  quantum  fields.  However,  the  physics  of  mental  adaptability
requires something completely different. If, as suggested here, the system is at the edge of chaos,
it can take advantage of local non-predictability to create the future it desires. In the case of
champion tennis players, service returns can be hit in whichever direction they conceive. Mind
has the ability to create an idea, transmit it to the motor cortex, and put it into action. Tell the
CEO of any Fortune 500 company that such is not the case, and see the reaction you provoke! 
Quite  how  the  six  layered  structure  of  the  neocortex  permits  the  conception  of  an  action
originating in the brain to be set in motion in the outside world is beyond the scope of the present
article, but it is no more difficult a problem to solve than the nature of dual aspect information in
experience.  It  just  requires  identifying  available  freedoms  and  playing  with  them  until  a
reasonable sequence of processes is identified. 
Suffice it to say that the quantum nature of reality contains the possibility that the conscious
creative intelligence inherent in experience can inject information into the world of experience
when it chooses to do so, using Penrose’s OR, not in sense perception, but in control of action.
An appropriate model of the world of sense perception is required: a quantum world unfolding in
time through the injection of information produced in quantum wave packet reduction events, as
Stapp  and  others  consider  correct.  In  this  picture  of  reality,  conscious  beings  can  be  co-
participators in the unfolding of creation, by orchestrating the reduction of wave-packets within
their own motor cortices. 
Mind and Matter:  Granted that matter ordinarily presents us with stable properties, while a
healthy mind offers extreme adaptability (based no doubt on stable personality characteristics
like self-esteem and self-confidence), it is natural to describe the former by properties stabilized
by quantum fields, and the latter  by critical  instabilities where the stabilizing quantum fields
have been annihilated – by processes of self-observation. Minds are criticality based, singular
self-observing systems. 
Descartes  was  at  pains  to  point  out  that  mind,  Res  Cogitans,  and  matter,  Res  Extensa,  are
completely different. Again, my personal view is in agreement, categorically mind and matter are
in  complete  contrast  to  each other,  suggesting  that  different  physics  should be employed  to
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describe them. That the physics of instability is totally different from the physics of stability
therefore  affords  me  considerable  satisfaction,  though  I  recognize  that  this  may  only  be  a
personal view. 
If we accept this position that the essential difference between mind and matter requires equally
different physical descriptions, a quick way of identifying the physics of mind is available. Mind,
if it exists is apparently able to control matter. If I choose to raise my arm I can do so. If it was
holding a tennis ball which got tossed in the air, I may be able to hit an appropriate service. 
By implication, control theory is the natural candidate to look for a place to find physics different
from the quantum physics of stability  characteristic of matter.  But the only conditions under
which this obtains is at feedback instabilities, the mathematical singularities identified by Wiener
who  makes  the  specific  point  that  his  integro-differential  equations,  and  the  feedback
singularities  contained  in  them  make  Cybernetics,  his  mathematics  and  physics  of  control,
completely different from all previous physics based on ordinary partial differential equations. In
this light, the instabilities in control theory50, should have been the natural first candidates to
explore in attempting to develop a physical theory of mind and its decision making processes. 
This article has told the story of how such a theory unfolds, and how an ability to support a sense
of identity and agency, with a ‘sense of self’, a sense of ‘being in time’, and a ‘sense of presence’
emerges from it. These properties may also help explain why criticality states apparently play a
universal role at the locus of control of biological organisms. Possessing an awareness of time
passing, being in time, and a sense of agency based on a sense of self, will greatly increase an
organism’s effectiveness in making appropriate decisions in complex, changing environments,
i.e. its ‘street-cred’. 
As  regards  the  main  results  based  on  long-range  coherence,  systems  identified  by  material
science with long-range coherence encompassing the entire system are all instabilities. Long-
range, all-inclusive coherence seems to be a form of internal organization strictly alternative to
quantization. Systems possessing it have singular potentials. Those supporting quanta as systems
of stabilizing normal modes possess Hooke’s Law potentials. Normal modes are requisite for
stability of form, the fundamental of matter. Edge of chaos instability is required for an entity to
make choices. It should be taken as a fundamental of mind. So also should non-linearity, the
38
essence of which is a mathematical singularity representing physical instability, at the root of the
singular self-observing systems at the foundation of phenomenal experience. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
With their dual aspect structure, <=====O, information states at criticality include the ‘sense of
self’ inherent in all experience, and can support the internal sense of the passing of time that
pervades  experience,  and,  in  <O,  Pure  Being.  They  constitute  authentic  representations  of
experience,  satisfying  all  scientific  prerequisites  for  a  theory of  experience.As  a  model  of
phenomenal  experience  based in  complexity  biology,  they  fulfill  all  proposed scientific  and
philosophical  requirements.  The model has implications for many scientific fields;  experts  in
each field should search for possible conflicts or internal inconsistencies, to see where it may
need further refining or extending. 
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1. Restoring potentials not Hooke’s Law Not quantizable; no stabilizing quantum fields
2. Long-range correlations High temperature coherence
3. Negative Entropy Inherent Order / Low entropy of life
4. States not separable Fully Non-Reductive Physics
5. Fundamental states are Mixtures Inherent information
6. Each Mixture carries a loop Represent by <========O
7. Feedback loop has g = 1 Singular self-observing system – SSOS 
8. Self-observation Self-knowledge – Attribute of Consciousness
9. Self-observation annihilates Quanta Absence of Quanta – ORof Wave Packet 
10. Edge of Chaos – bifurcation region Genuine choice possible 
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